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The White House recently released a report on the handling of Hurricane Katrina. The report,
prepared by Francis Townsend, Bush's domestic security advisor made many recommendations
for reform. Among them are:
A greater partnership between federal, state and local governments in regards to
emergency preparation and preparedness
A larger role for the Pentagon and military forces, including active-duty forces,
in the response to major disasters
The need for a clear message to emergency workers with respect to which agency
is in charge of response and decisions, particularly with respect to the provision
of medical assistance
The need for larger stockpiles of emergency supplies, along with an enhanced
ability to track them.
Some other recommendations are to include the disabled, sick, and elderly in evacuation plans
and to ensure that drills accurately test existing plans.2 The standard National'Guard forces were
judged to be effective during the initial response but were insufficient for such a large-scale task
with sustained operations. Fifty thousand more from all fifty states and D.C. were needed.
Standard equipment between agencies should be used as the National Guard, the Army and
Department of Homeland Security had issues with interoperability of their communication
equipment not unlike what happened during 9/11 with the Police and Fire Department using
different walkie-talkie wavelengths.3
Improving federal, state, and local coordination is clearly key, although there are differences of
opinion with respect to how best to do this. Recently, Department of Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff said the Federal Emergency Management Agency should not be
considered the front line of defense in future disasters. He would leave it up to the state and local
governments with FEMA playing a supporting role. He suggests putting a federal disaster
1 I wish to thankDr. Sawoskifor his specialeditorialhelpwith this paper.
2 UnitedStates,HomelandSecurityAdvisorFrancesTownsend,The FederalResponseto Hurricane
KatOna:LessonsLearned (Washington2006).
3 Ibid.
coordinator in states who would report directly back to him. State emergency managers fear that
part of the plan will create another level of bureaucracy to deal with in the midst of a disaster.
The National Emergency Management Association, however, supports putting a federal disaster
coordinator in high-risk states.4
The Townsend Report also highlights three overarching concerns or gaps that need to be
addressed.
First, the government must implement a new "National Preparedness System" to make certain
we have a completely seamless national response system that ensures cooperation and unity in
preparing for and responding to natural and man-made disasters. The existing national
preparedness system must be improved to minimize the impact of disasters on lives, property,
and the economy. The existing system is said to be a maze of red tape and bureaucratic
nightmares, therefore the new one should be more streamlined to eliminate delays and
frustration. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security should focus more on increasing
its capacity to direct the federal response effort while providing resources to emergency
responders. An all-encompassing system, including a1J.levels of government private sector,
grass-roots, communities, and individuals, has to be formed that would allow for complete
national preparedness in the case of a national disaster.s
Second, the U.S. needs to create a "culture of preparedness" that addresses the entire country, at
all levels of government and community, along with the private sector and individual citizens.
Everyone should share the goals and responsibilities for homeland security. To create the culture
of preparedness, much effort and time will be needed. This is a long-term project and will not be
completed soon. Initiative and innovation must be recognized and rewarded at all levels.
Individuals must playa central roie in preparing themselves and their families for emergencies.
They must be able to take the initiative to evacuate or otherwise transport their families before
emergencies. If an evacuation is mandatory, everyone must follow it or face certain dire
consequences. Again, as part of this, federal, state, and local governments must work in
4 "Chertoff: Katrina a 'Great Wake - Up Call"'. Associated Press. (AprilI2, 2006).
5 Townsend, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.
partnership with each other and the private sector. Partnership between governments on all
levels and the private sector are key for success.6
Third, the government must put into practice corrective actions to ensure we do not repeat the
problems of Katrina. The report recommends several, relatively specific critical actions that
should be put into place before the next hurricane season, a mere seven weeks from now. The
most important ones are listed here.
To ensure that federal, state, and local authority figures and decision makers work
closely together in proximity to one another in the event of a disaster.
To ensure awareness of the situation by forming "rapid deployable
communications".
"Embed a single Departm~nt of Defense point of contact at the Federal Joint Field
Office and FEMA regional offices to enhance coordination of military resources
supporting the response".
"Identify and develop rosters of Federal, State, and local government personnel who
are prepared to assist in disaster relief".
"Identify and develop rosters of Federal, State, and local government personnel who
are prepared to assist in disaster relief" .
"Improve the delivery of assistance to disaster victims by streamlining registration,
expediting eligibility decisions, tracking movements of displaced victims, and
incorporating safeguards against fraud".
"Enhance ongoing review of State evacuation plans and incorporate planning for
Continuity of Government to ensure the continuation of essential and emergency
services" .7
Criticism of the Townsend report has come from every side-and started before the report was
released. At issue was whether or not the Federal Government could be impartial in its
investigation .. "'The idea that anyone in the White House might produce a report that
embarrasses the president or holds people accountable is just naIve,' one source told IPS"B.
Indeed, several emergency response and preparedness experts agree that the Townsend Report is
just a whitewash that will spare the White House from blame or at the very least direct most of it
at the state and local authorities. 'IIIt is a waste of time and money when attention should be paid
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
B Fisher, William. "Critics Predict Katrina Whitewash". Inter Press Service News Agency. (9/21/05).
to how to rectify such incompetence, which requires an independent assessment,'" said one of
them.9
The Congressionally-funded Government Accountability Office (GAO) released its own report
also more critical of the federal government than the Townsend Report. GAO's report, in
particular, castigated the administration for not establishing "a clear chain of command for
domestic emergency; [the administration] disregarded early warnings of a Category 5 hurricane
inundating New Orleans and southeast Louisiana; and did not ensure that cities and states had
adequate plans and training before the Aug. 29 storm".l0
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) own, independent Office of the Inspector General
released a report on April 14, 2006 more critical than the Townsend Report of the DHS's
preparations for a natural disaster of Katrina's magnitude, "The federal government, and FEMA
in particular, has received widespread criticism for a slow and ineffective response to Hurricane
Katrina," the report concludes. "Much of the criticism is warranted."ll The report also directly
criticized Chertoff's plan for FEMA to assist overwhelmed states during a disaster as "insufficient
for an event of Hurricane Katrina's magnitude."12 The DHS Inspector General's report
highlighted some thirty-eight additional, detailed recommendations that would call for "better
training, coordination and systems for ensuring communications among local and state
emergency responders and between federal agencies providing aid. They also call for more
clearly defined roles and an established chain of command within the federal government".B
Representative Tom Davis, R-Va., has aptly summed up charges that the government was simply
not prepared for a storm of this magnitude: "The director ... of the National Hurricane Center said
this was the big one," Davis said, but "when this happened ... Bush is in Texas. Card is in Maine.
The vice president is fly-fishing. I mean, who's in charge here?"14
9 Ibid.
10Goldstein,AmyandHsu, Spencer."Scaldingcriticismof administration'sKatrina responseGAOreport
blames leadersat the top for a host ofmissteps".WashingtonPost. (2/2/06).
11"InternalReportUrgesChangesAfterKatrina"AssociatedPress. (4/14/06).
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14GoldsteinandHsu. "Scaldingcriticismof administration'sKatrinaresponseGAG report blames leaders
at the top for a host of missteps".
What these separate reports and criticisms indicate is that the government needs to have a fully
independent investigation about what went wrong with the Katrina response; one that is not
controlled by the Administration. Most importantly, there needs to be one clear and.
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